THREE THINGS were immediately clear when the exit polls in Germany’s election dropped at 6pm on February 23rd. The first was that the opposition conservative Christian Democrats (CDU), along with their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), had won a clear victory—if an underwhelming one, with slightly less than 30% of the vote. That paves the way for their candidate, Friedrich Merz (pictured), to take over from Olaf Scholz as chancellor after coalition talks. The second was that the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) had surged to its best-ever score, with close to 20%, a result that will roughly double its number of seats in the Bundestag. Alice Weidel, the party’s co-leader, hailed the “historic success”. The third was the extraordinary turnout. Some 84% of eligible Germans cast a ballot, the highest figure since reunification 35 years ago.
Beyond that, it was a mess. Mr Merz will hope to form a coalition with Mr Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD), who at 16% slumped to their worst defeat in their party’s long history. But whether Germany’s main centre-left and centre-right parties will be able to form what used to be known as a “grand” coalition depends on the performance of two much smaller parties: the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) and the new “left-conservative” Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). Projected results put both on the cusp of the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament. If neither qualifies, the CDU/CSU and SPD will have a majority, though only a slender one. If both or possibly even just one do, the two bigger parties would need a third partner: either the Greens or (more likely, given the CSU’s loathing of the environmentalists) the FDP. An ideologically messy three-party government is exactly what Mr Merz, who wants to act decisively to restore German voters’ faith in politics, had hoped to avoid.
Even building a coalition with the SPD alone will not be at all easy. After what by German standards was a rough campaign, many fear it will prove difficult to build the necessary trust and find the compromises German coalition deals require. One SPD MP recently said the prospect of a grand coalition made her “feel like gagging”. Mr Merz did not help his case by spending election eve ranting at “green and left-wing idiots” who he suggested were not in possession of a full quotient of marbles. A bigger challenge will be his willingness to compromise on his proposals to manage irregular immigration to Germany. Mr Merz has said his demands for permanent controls at Germany’s borders and the rejection of asylum-seekers are non-negotiable. But both the SPD and Greens say they contravene domestic and European law.
The two would-be governing parties will also need to find agreement on loosening Germany’s constitutional debt brake, which makes it impossible for the federal government to run more than tiny deficits. Germany’s investment needs run into the hundreds of billions, to cover everything from repairing its crumbling public infrastructure to boosting its defence spending. Merely to meet NATO’s (increasingly insufficient) target of 2% of GDP, the country will need to find at least another €30bn ($31bn) a year from 2028 once a special fund runs out. The budget cuts proposed by Mr Merz cannot hope to meet these needs. That is why he has signalled openness to relaxing the debt brake, fealty to which has long been an article of faith among his party troops.
Yet since constitutional changes require two-thirds majorities in parliament, that will also depend on its precise composition. Should the FDP (which emphasises fiscal rectitude) or the BSW (which opposes boosting defence spending) make it in, the governing parties might need to secure support from Die Linke, a hard-left party that enjoyed an extraordinary last-minute surge, especially among young voters, to win around 9% of the vote. As another “pro-peace” party, its support, if forthcoming, will surely carry a high price.
Whatever the final result, it is not an outcome that will please those that had hoped desperately for political clarity in a country that has long been lacking it. Neither party hoping to govern can be satisfied. The CDU/CSU’s victory is largely a function of the outgoing government’s unpopularity: it once hoped to win over 35% of the vote, but in fact scored its second-worst result ever. That may revive old doubts inside the party over Mr Merz. Meanwhile the SPD’s disastrous performance will inspire a period of insular soul-searching and a clearout of personnel: Mr Scholz, for one, will soon be history. (Lars Klingbeil, the party’s co-leader, is now the figure to watch.) “It’s a bitter result, and it hurts,” Alexander Schweitzer, the SPD minister-president of the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, told The Economist. The only parties celebrating tonight are two fringe outfits with no hope of entering government: the AfD and Die Linke.
Ordinarily, a result like this would inspire a bout of navel-gazing among Germany’s main parties before they settled into coalition talks. But this time is different. Donald Trump has upended the diplomacy around Ukraine, forcing Europe into a panicked hive of diplomatic activity. One minute after polls closed in Germany António Costa, the president of the European Council, called a special EU summit for March 6th to discuss Ukraine and European security. As Germany’s chancellor until a replacement is elected by the Bundestag, Mr Scholz will attend that meeting, but he will need to consult closely with the man who will replace him. As Mr Merz acknowledged as he accepted victory, “The world is not waiting for us.” ■