THE FUNDAMENTAL choice for any country is whether to shape the world or be shaped by it. Throughout its history, Britain has chosen to shape the world. With the international situation so precarious, it must continue to do so.
That is why, as British prime minister, I announced an increase in defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, as well as providing multi-year funding for Ukraine’s armed forces. Even more is required now. And that should include seizing frozen Russian state assets. We must be prepared to use all our powers as we respond to this moment.
There are two reasons why an increase in defence spending is imperative, and why I was glad to see Sir Keir Starmer, my successor in 10 Downing Street, announcing this week that Britain will raise defence spending. The first is the threat we face from the axis of authoritarian states: Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. These countries are hostile to democratic states’ interests and values. They are increasingly working together to undermine the international order.
The second reason is to strengthen the transatlantic partnership on which the security of the West depends. NATO has been the most successful alliance in history. But no alliance can succeed, or survive in the long term, if not every member is pulling its weight.
Britain has a record of consistently having hit the NATO minimum of spending 2% of GDP on defence. More than that, when there is a crisis—such as Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea or Iran’s attack on Israel—we are almost always the first country to commit its forces alongside America’s to deal with the threat.
But too many other NATO members have repeatedly failed to do their bit, and have just assumed that America would always pick up the slack. This was never sustainable. As I said when announcing that increase in defence spending, we cannot expect America to bear burdens that we are not prepared to bear ourselves.
As well as raising our own defence spending, we must also find ways to get more resources to Ukraine. Any durable peace there will rely on Ukraine having the means to deter any future Russian aggression.
One unused source of funding is the Russian state assets that are currently frozen. There are about $300bn-worth of these, predominantly in European financial systems.
There are legal challenges to seizing these assets, but they can be overcome, as recent work by international legal experts such as Paul Reichler shows. Russia’s brutal assault on Ukraine has so violated the principle of “sovereign equality”—that all states have a duty to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other states—that it is hard to see how this concept can be invoked to stop these assets from being seized and used to compensate the victim of Vladimir Putin’s illegal aggression.
Indeed, the fact that we are already using the interest from these assets to benefit the people of Ukraine shows that there is no fundamental principle stopping us from acting. At the very least, Russia should be aware—ahead of any negotiation—that we are prepared to do this. Interestingly, reports emerged from the recent talks between Russia and America in Saudi Arabia that Russia has already begun to discuss whether its frozen assets could be used for reconstruction.
Some finance ministries and central banks worry that if we seize Russian assets, other states will withdraw their money from Western financial systems, fearful that they may in time lose assets in the same way. Some European governments are particularly worried about this. But I believe that this concern is overstated, and I am not alone: Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, and Petr Fiala, his Czech counterpart, have both been explicit in advocating the use of frozen Russian assets to clear up this mess of Moscow’s making.
In the run-up to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia cynically tried to move its financial assets to places it thought less likely to freeze or seize them. Research by my colleagues at the Hoover Institution shows that Russia moved 87% of its dollar holdings in America out of the country in the first two months of 2022. Yet the fact that $300bn remains under the jurisdiction of America and its allies shows how limited the options are for Russia and other rogue states when it comes to shielding such assets.
Furthermore, if the financial centres of Europe, North America and democratic Asia act together, the risk that seizing the assets causes financial upheaval can be contained. Acting in concert can ensure that there is no systemic risk to any financial system from using the assets to compensate Ukraine.
Once transferred to Ukraine, this money can be used to ensure that the country can not only recover from the war but also prevent a repeat of it. Ukraine can spend the money on rebuilding civilian infrastructure targeted by Russia, on restabilising its economy and on building armed forces that can deter Russia. The reconstruction bill will run to hundreds of billions of dollars—and it is only fair that Russia should pay for the damage its war has caused.
Post-war Ukraine will also need armed forces that are properly equipped to defend the country. I know the difference that quality weaponry can make to Ukraine. When I was prime minister, Britain was the first country to send it long-range weapons. These Storm Shadow missiles played a crucial role in driving back Russia’s Black Sea fleet. This enabled Ukraine to resume maritime grain exports, providing a vital economic boost.
By equipping Ukraine’s armed forces with high-quality weapons and giving it security guarantees, its allies can ensure that any peace is not just a pause in the Russian assault.
The brave people of Ukraine deserve a future of peace and prosperity. Transferring the frozen Russian assets to them can help give them that. This is a complicated task—which is why we need to get to work on it as a matter of urgency. ■
Rishi Sunak was Britain’s prime minister from 2022 to 2024. He is the Member of Parliament for Richmond and Northallerton and the William C. Edwards distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution.Read other recent By Invitations on this subject by Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Sanna Marin