WHO WILL be next? As America abandons Ukraine and ignores European allies, its closest friends in Asia ask whether they too will be shaken down or cast aside. The worries grow deeper as China flexes its muscles. In recent weeks it has conducted naval live-fire exercises off Taiwan, in the Gulf of Tonkin and as far as the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand. On February 25th, Taiwan detained a Chinese ship suspected of severing an undersea cable.
America’s Asian allies are torn between competing theories. One holds that Asia is different from Europe because China poses a far greater threat than Russia does. America thus needs Asian allies more than European ones, and will defend the “first island chain” in the Pacific—including Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines—as the best means to contain China.
The Trump administration, moreover, contains China hawks such as Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, and Mike Waltz, the national security adviser. They have assured friends about America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Military spending has so far been protected from cuts elsewhere. Donald Trump has hosted both the Japanese and Indian prime ministers. The administration’s language on Taiwan, a self-governing island that China claims as its own, has been toughened.
The contrary view is that Mr Trump has not yet turned his mind to Asia. He thinks all allies are a burden, so will resort to threats, tariffs and demands for gains in return for protection. In his first term he threatened to withdraw American troops from South Korea. Mr Trump has proposed tariffs on microchips, and claimed Taiwan “stole” America’s semiconductor industry. Unlike his predecessor, Joe Biden, he refuses to say whether he would defend the island. He may be reverting to conventional “strategic ambiguity”, except that he has intimated Taiwan is not worth protecting. As for Messrs Rubio and Waltz, their loyalty to the president eclipses long-held beliefs. They reassured Europeans that Mr Trump would not forsake Ukraine. But when he did, they cheered him on.
Even as he escalates the trade war with China, Mr Trump has spoken about striking a deal with its leader, Xi Jinping, suggesting they could work to solve the world’s problems. He has mused about a three-way summit with Mr Xi and Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, to reduce nuclear stockpiles and cut defence spending.
All this suggests a belief in spheres of influence. The question is whether Mr Trump thinks America’s domain begins at the first island chain or deeper into the Pacific. “Trump likely wants to avoid war more than he wants to maintain US primacy in China’s neighbourhood,” says Denny Roy of the East-West Centre, a think-tank in Honolulu. “His natural inclination is a world of empires in which the three great powers annex their respective near-abroads and then don’t bother each other.”
Opinion among Asian allies ranges from worried to alarmed. One Taiwanese official admits he cannot sleep at night. Richard Heydarian of the University of the Philippines argues that America cannot be fully relied on. Singapore, astride a major maritime trade route, is jittery. The Trump administration’s assurances thus far amount to “bureaucratic momentum”, says William Choong of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a think-tank in Singapore. “Once Trump turns his attention to this region, who knows what will happen?”
One response to the uncertainty is to avoid catching Mr Trump’s eye. Ishiba Shigeru, the Japanese prime minister, said on March 3rd he had “no intention of taking sides” in the crisis between America and Ukraine. Another is to assuage the president. Mr Ishiba promised to boost the stock of Japanese direct investments in America from nearly $800bn in 2023 to $1trn. Taiwan’s most important chipmaker, TSMC, announced $100bn worth of investments to build new facilities in America. Further measures include raising defence spending and buying more American weapons and liquefied natural gas.
Some Asians complain that paying tribute to America is no different from bowing before China—and at least Mr Xi offers his neighbours favourable trade deals. China is playing on such fears. As a recent commentary by the state-run Xinhua news agency notes: being an American ally can prove “fatal”, and countries that thought of themselves as important partners will become “discarded chess pieces”. ■
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