Having built the world’s largest navy, China is keen to show it off. But officials from Australia and New Zealand have been startled in recent days by the way it has been flaunting itself in Oceania. On February 21st a commercial pilot flying over the Tasman Sea received a surprise warning from a Chinese navy task-force in international waters that it was engaging in live-fire drills. Airlines scrambled to divert planes. Since then, the two Chinese warships and one supply vessel have staged an unprecedented circumnavigation of Australia, fuelling political debate about a power that once seemed distant.
The task force includes a 10,000-tonne cruiser of a type that China hailed—with justification—as a “leap forward” in its naval modernisation when it joined service in 2020 (the year the Pentagon said China’s navy had surpassed its own in size). The ships may have been joined by a nuclear-powered submarine: in the past 15 years, China has been churning these out at the rate of nearly one a year, the Pentagon reports. China is not accused of behaving illegally, but one Australian intelligence chief, Andrew Shearer, said some of its activities “seem designed to be provocative”.
This is the farthest south China has ever sent its navy for training. The firing drills seemed designed to highlight its ability to project force far from home. And they appeared to show indifference to the impact. Australia and New Zealand have complained that they did not get sufficient warning about the live firing.
Planning for the exercises may have predated Donald Trump’s election as America’s president in November 2024. But the timing of them, as America turns its back on European allies, has added to anxieties in Australia and New Zealand about their own security in the second Trump term. China may want to show that not only can it sustain its ships for long periods at sea, but also, in a conflict, interfere with the sea lanes that Australia relies on, says Jennifer Parker, a former naval officer now at the Australian National University.
In Australia the Chinese navy’s activities are causing rows ahead of federal elections, due within weeks. The centre-left Labor government, led by Anthony Albanese, says it has “stabilised” relations with China, which in the past couple of years has lifted restrictions imposed in 2020 on Australian exports worth more than A$20bn ($13bn) annually. China hawks in the opposition centre-right Liberal Party complain that Labor has gone too soft on China in order to restore that trade.
During Australia’s spell in the doghouse—for daring to call for an inquiry into the origins of covid-19—it found other buyers for its coal, barley and the like, enabling it to achieve a record trade surplus in 2022. But its concerns about China’s military behaviour kept growing. Australian officials acknowledge that their own armed forces operate in international waters and airspace close to China. But China’s response is sometimes dangerous. Last month a Chinese fighter jet released flares close to an Australian p-8a surveillance plane over the South China Sea.
Both Australia and New Zealand have another worry, that China may be strengthening its ability to deploy its forces in the region by cosying up to South Pacific microstates. In February the Cook Islands agreed to form a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China and announced plans for Chinese investment, including port-building.
New Zealand’s foreign minister, Winston Peters, said his country was “blindsided”. It has close ties with the Cook Islands, including an arrangement to co-ordinate their security and foreign policies. Mihai Sora of the Lowy Institute, a think-tank in Sydney, says China has reason to be drawn to the Cook Islands (population: 16,800). It could, he says, become a good spot to refuel and resupply task forces—like the one sailing around Australia. ■
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